LYNETTE
BOGGS-McDONALD, Las Vegas City Councilwoman
This
matter came before six members[1]
of the Nevada Commission on Ethics (hereinafter the “Commission”) for
hearing on June 21, 2001, pursuant to a Request for Opinion submitted in proper
form to the Commission on March 12, 2001, under NRS 281.511, Subsection 2, and a
written panel determination entered May 2, 2001, finding just and sufficient
cause for the Commission to render an opinion in this matter regarding whether
Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald’s alleged failure to disclose a “gift”
contributed in October 1999 by Station Casinos and action taken on matters
concerning Station Casinos before the Las Vegas City Council in September 2000
violated the provisions of NRS 281.501, Subsections 2 and/or 3.
Notice
of the hearing was property posted and served.
Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald was present with her counsel, John H. Mowbray,
Esq., and was sworn and testified.
The
Commission, after full consideration of the record in this matter, makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
1.
Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald represents Ward 2 of the City of Las Vegas on the Las Vegas City
Council. She was appointed to that
position in 1999 and re-elected in the spring 2001 primary election.
2.
Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald traveled to Chicago in the fall of 1999 to attend a football game
at the University of Notre Dame, her alma mater, and network with fellow alumni
as it related to her campaign.
3.
The trip was at least
in part paid for by Station Casinos, and Station Casinos provided to
Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald evidence of its value as a campaign contribution for
reporting purposes.
4.
Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald reported the value of the trip as an in-kind campaign
contribution pursuant to NRS 294A.007. The
campaign contribution report was timely filed pursuant to NRS 294A.120.
5.
Matters concerning
Station Casinos came before the Las Vegas City Council in September 2000.
Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald made no disclosure of the fall 1999 Chicago
trip when she participated in the City Council’s deliberations of and voted on
matters affecting Station Casinos at the September 2000 City Council meeting.
6.
At about the same time
as the request for opinion in this matter was filed with the Commission, a
complaint was filed with the Office of the Secretary of State challenging the
valuation of the trip and its characterization as an “in-kind campaign
contribution.”
7.
After investigating
the complaint, on May 15, 2001, the Office of the Secretary of State closed the
matter finding that Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald complied with the regulatory
requirement for placing a value on the trip and properly reported it as a
campaign contribution.
1.
Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald is a public officer as defined by NRS 281.005 and NRS 281.4365.
2.
The Commission has
jurisdiction to render an opinion in this matter pursuant to NRS 281.465,
Subsection 1(a); and NRS 281.511, Subsection 2(b).
WHEREFORE,
on motion duly made, seconded, and approved by majority vote[2],
the Commission renders the following Opinion:
NRS
281.501, Subsection 3, prohibits a public officer from approving, disapproving,
voting, abstaining from voting, or otherwise acting upon any matter (a)
regarding which he has accepted a gift or loan; (b) which would reasonably be
affected by his commitment in a private capacity to the interest or others; or
(c) in which he has a pecuniary interest; “without disclosing sufficient
information concerning the gift, loan, commitment or interest to inform the
public of the potential effect of the action or abstention upon the person who
provided the gift or loan, upon the person to whom he has a commitment, or upon
his interest.” However, NRS
281.501, Subsection 3, expressly does not require a public officer to disclose
any campaign contributions that the public officer reported pursuant to NRS
294A.120 in a timely manner.
The
Secretary of State’s Office, which has jurisdiction over the provisions of NRS
Chapter 294A relating to the definition and reporting of campaign contributions,
investigated the issues of how the trip was valued and whether it was properly a
campaign contribution and found that Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald valued the trip
in accordance with regulatory requirements and properly reported that value as
an in-kind campaign contribution pursuant to NRS 294A.120.
So
long as Nevada’s campaign finance laws provide for disclosure with regard to
campaign contributions, the public interest presumably is served by its access
to campaign finance reports filed with the Office of the Secretary of State by
public officers and candidates for public office, even though public officers
are not required to disclose campaign contributions under NRS 281.501,
Subsection 3. The Commission has no
statutory authority or jurisdiction to define as a “gift” for purposes of
NRS 281.501, Subsection 3, a donation to a public officer’s political campaign
that has been defined as a “campaign contribution” by the Office of the
Secretary of State, the agency which has jurisdiction to make such a
determination.
Therefore,
based upon the disclosure safe harbor provision of NRS 281.501, Subsection 3(c),
with regard to campaign contributions reported by a public officer in a timely
manner pursuant to NRS 294A.120, the Commission finds that Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald had no obligation under NRS 281.501(3) to disclose the in-kind
campaign contribution she received in the fall of 1999 from Station Casinos.
Her conduct in September 2000 when she acted upon matters before the Las
Vegas City Council concerning Station Casinos, therefore, did not violate NRS
281.501, Subsection 3.
However,
as the Commission noted in Opinion No. 99-61, NRS 281.501, Subsection 3, clearly
does not prohibit
a public officer from disclosing any campaign contributions that may appear
significant enough in relationship to the public officer’s total campaign
budget to raise the question of the contribution’s effect on the public
officer’s independence of judgment or that of a reasonable person in the
public officer’s position. Such
cases may implicate the disclosure standards of NRS 281.501, Subsection 2, and
the abstention standards of NRS 281.501, Subsection 3, and the guidance thereon
provided in Commission Opinion No. 99-56, the “Woodbury Opinion.”[3]
Abstention
under NRS 281.501, Subsection 2, however, is a more difficult issue.
NRS 281.501, Subsection 2, provides that “[i]n addition to the
requirements of the code of ethical standards, a public officer shall not vote
upon or advocate the passage or failure of, but may otherwise participate in the
consideration of a matter with respect to which the independence of judgment of
a reasonable person in his situation would be materially affected by (a) his
acceptance of a gift or loan; (b) his pecuniary interest; or (c) his commitment
in a private capacity to the interests of others”
In Subsection 2 of NRS 281.501, the Legislature did not provide the same
safe harbor language regarding campaign contributions as it did in Subsection 3
of NRS 281.501 regarding disclosure. Yet,
it would be inconsistent to conclude that a public officer would have no
obligation under NRS 281.501, Subsection 3, to disclose a timely and properly
reported campaign contribution, but would nevertheless violate the provisions of
NRS 281.501, Subsection 2, by participating in the discussion of and voting on
matters coming before the public officer concerning the entity that made the
campaign contribution.
Unless
clearly disqualified, public officers have a public duty to act on matters that
come before them. To require
otherwise would deprive the public of its elected or appointed representation.
As the Commission noted in a prior opinion:[4]
[T]he
public (and an elected official’s constituents) have an interest in matters
which come before such officers and employees.
Abstention deprives the public and that official’s constituents of a
voice in governmental affairs. And,
public officers and employees should have the opportunity to perform the duties
for which they were elected or appointed, except where private commitments would
materially
affect one’s independence of judgment. Compliance
with disclosure requirements informs the citizenry as to how its public officers
and employees exercise their discretion and independent judgment.
And, in exercising their discretion and independent judgment, public
officers and employees are accountable to their constituents or their appointing
authority. The burden, therefore,
is appropriately on the public officer or employee to disclose private
commitments and the effect those private commitments can have on the
decision-making process, and to make a proper determination regarding abstention
where a reasonable person’s independence of judgment would be materially affected by those private
commitments.
Notwithstanding
the foregoing discussion, however, public officers must remember that under some
circumstances campaign contributions may qualify as a “gift” for purposes of
Nevada’s Ethics in Government law. In
a previous Commission opinion in an unrelated matter,[5]
the Commission addressed the issue of whether particular campaign contributions
were a gift “which would tend improperly to influence a reasonable person in
the public officer’s position to depart from the faithful and impartial
discharge of his public duties” under NRS 281.481, Subsection 1.
The Commission concluded, under the facts and circumstances in that
matter, that the campaign contributions in issue would not improperly influence
a reasonable man in the public officer’s place, nor did they improperly
influence the public officer. The campaign contributions at issue were “a small
percentage [six percent] of [the public officer’s] total campaign budget.”[6]
However, the Commission’s opinion was based on more than the mere
percentage amount.
The
record in Opinion No. 95-51 reflected that the campaign contributions at issue
were all properly reported and there was no direct evidence of an express quid
pro quo between the contributors and the public officer.
The Commission, however, was “not prepared to issue a blanket statement
that properly disclosed campaign contributions will never qualify as a ‘gift . . . which would tend improperly to
influence a reasonable person in his position to depart from the faithful and
impartial discharge of his public duties.’”[7]
The Commission further stated:
As
the test makes clear, the question is not whether money is a “gift,” but
rather whether the money would improperly influence a reasonable man. It is conceivable that a campaign contribution could be
deemed to improperly influence a reasonable man depending upon the amount of the contribution, the
identity of the donor, the timing of the gift, and other such factors.[8]
(Emphasis added).
There
is absolutely no evidence in this matter that ties the in-kind campaign
contribution Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald received from Station Casinos to any
action taken by the Las Vegas City Council on matters concerning Station
Casinos. Further, there is no
allegation in this matter of unethical conduct of any kind suggesting that the
in-kind campaign contribution Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald received from Station
Casinos improperly influenced Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald in the exercise of
independent judgment on matters coming before her concerning Station Casinos, or
that it would so influence a reasonable person in Councilwoman
Boggs-McDonald’s position. Nor is
there any evidence at all that Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald in any way violated
the public trust by not abstaining from participating in and voting on matters
before the Las Vegas City Council concerning Station Casinos, even though the
campaign contribution safe harbor language is absent from NRS 281.501,
Subsection 2.
Therefore,
the Commission further finds that Councilwoman Boggs-McDonald’s conduct as
discussed herein did not violate the provisions of NRS 281.501, Subsection 2.
NOTE:
THE FOREGOING OPINION APPLIES ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES DEFINED HEREIN. FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DIFFER FROM THOSE IN THIS OPINION MAY RESULT IN AN
OPINION CONTRARY TO THIS OPINION. NO
INFERENCES REGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF NEVADA REVISED STATUTES QUOTED AND
DISCUSSED IN THIS OPINION MAY BE DRAWN TO APPLY GENERALLY TO ANY OTHER FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES.
DATED:
August 8, 2001.
NEVADA
COMMISSION ON ETHICS
By:
TODD RUSSELL, Chairman
[1] Commission Chairman Bernhard, Commission Vice Chairman Russell, and Commission Members Avansino, Flangas, Hsu, and Smith. Commission members Hatcher and Kosinski did not participate in this hearing pursuant to NRS 281.462, Subsection 4.
[2] Commissioners Bernhard, Russell, Avansino, Hsu, and Smith voted “aye;” Commissioner Flangas voted “no.”
[3] Commission Opinion No. 99-56, In the Matter of the Opinion Request of Bruce L. Woodbury, dated December 22, 1999.
[4] See, Commission Opinion No. 99-56, In the Matter of the Opinion Request of Bruce L. Woodbury, dated December 22, 1999.
[5] See, Commission Amended Opinion No. 95-51, In the Matter of the Opinion Request Regarding David A. Wood, dated June 6, 1997., and as discussed in Commission Opinion No. 99-61, In the Matter of the Request for Opinion Concerning the Conduct of Michael J. McDonald, dated September 18, 2000.
[6] Commission Opinion No. 95-51, pages 9-10.
[7] Commission Opinion No. 95-51, page 9.
[8]
Commission Opinion No. 95-51, page 9.